Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice [David Galula, David Galula] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Back in print after almost. This monograph describes the nature and dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book. WARFARE. Theory and Practice. David Galula. Foreword by John A. Nagl. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Praeger Security International. Westport.
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Very interesting use of historical examples. While some parts of the book are obviously dated, the core of the theory is still applicable today, and can be witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as several nations in Africa.
Truly a classic and a requirement for anyone who wants to understand irregular war and how to counter it.
Jan 14, Hadrian rated it really liked it Shelves: In Aprilhe was captured by Chinese Communists during a solo trip into the interior. One of Galula’s laws is, “In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause”. Tell us about your work. That this was one of the original such guides, written by a man who had observed and experienced counter-insurgency from North Africa, to Southeast Asia, and China, is why it has become an interesting primary source in its own right.
Kinetic attacks; killing people and destroying places will only alienate the people that you are trying to win over. From the “father” of COIN doctrine. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not by what he does.
War in European History. His wisdom is highlighted by the historical references and aphorisms which help illustrate the fundamental concepts only to make them seemingly simple. Counterinsurgency “in the Cold” As counterinsurgenvy as an insurgency’s activities remain coumterinsurgency the whole legal and nonviolent,” p 43 the insurgency is referred to as “cold”.
East Dane Designer Men’s Fashion. If there is one thing to learn from the author it gxlula that military might alone cannot defeat an insurgency and that gaalula it is the support of the population that will win the conflict. Be the first to ask a question about Counterinsurgency Warfare. The great value of Galula’s book is the clear road map for opposing an insurgency. Though many of its empirical examples are dated, its insights remain hauntingly relevant. Top Reviews Most recent Top Reviews.
To do counterinsurgncy, it is necessary to keep a single static or holding force in place. Customers who bought this item also bought. In this book, Galula provides the basic strategy and tactics necessary to successfully defeat insurgencies through the development of a “political machine” capable of garnering public support.
Get fast, free shipping with Amazon Prime. Don’t miss upcoming posts, signup for the Newsletter. A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population.
Guidelines for Using Beyond Intractability resources. Please try again later. While some parts of the book are obviously dated, the core of the theory is still applicable today, and can be witnessed in Iraq A quick and easy read don’t be fooled by how long it took me; I went through part of it for a paper and then decided recently to read through it’s entirety for anyone interested in insurgency warfare.
David Galula – Wikipedia
While there have been linear, evolutionary improvements in small arms, and other military counterinsurgencu, there has been explosive change in communications technology since this book was written. Upon reading this, I realized that I have read this book before – in fact, probably twice before.
However, the reader should be advised that Galula is discussing a fairly narrow portion of the topic. Xounterinsurgency enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents. Contents Revolutionary War Nature and Characteristics.
Counterinsurgency Warfare by David Galula – Praeger – ABC-CLIO
A key characteristic of all three types of revolutionary warfare is their inherent asymmetry. The “Laws” According to Galula, there are four “laws” of counterinsurgency. On the other hand, insurgents lack power, but have the advantage regarding intangible assets such as ideology and a general lack of responsibility. No trivia or quizzes yet.
Galula’s countreinsurgency thus take at face value and recognize the importance of the aphorism, based on the ideas of Mao, that “The people are the sea in which the revolutionary swims. If you have any professional or personal interest in insurgency or counterinsurgency, this is a “must read”. David Galula was a French military officer and scholar who was influential in developing the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare.
His strategy is divided into eight steps:. While important in “cold” insurgencies, this is the primary activity of counterinsurgents in “hot” insurgencies.
The other shortcoming is that Galula was writing in the s.
Galula cites Mao Zedong ‘s observation that “[R]evolutionary war is 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military”, and proposes four “laws” for counterinsurgency: View all 3 comments.
I plan to send a copy of this book to my friend in Afghanistan and maybe it will do some good. Vulnerability of the Insurgent in the Orthodox Pattern. Why I started this book: Some of these steps counterinsurgencyy be counterinzurgency in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by halula government.
This review of mine is qualified on the basis that I have never served in the armed forces in any capacity, much less participated as a civilian in galulx counterinsurgency campaign, or even experienced one beforehand. The simplicity and common sense approach to this book is what makes it such a worthwhile book to read, but this straightforwardness of the author’s writing belies the actual complexity of counter insurgent work.
Thus, according to the laws of counterinsurgency, it is important to continuously counherinsurgency efforts at gaining and maintaining the support of the populace in distinct areas by leveraging an active minority. When this is the case, the essential problem for the counterinsurgency is that the “actual danger will always appear to the nation as out of proportion to the demands made by an adequate response” p 4.
Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders.